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SANDOZ INC. V. AMGEN INC.:
REMOVING BARRIERS TO MARKET
ACCESS FOR BIOSIMILAR
MANUFACTURERS
MOYOSORE O. KOYA*
In 2017, the United States Supreme Court considered a case of first
impression, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.,1 a case centered on the patent dispute
between a biologics manufacturer and a biosimilar manufacturer. The named
corporations, Amgen Inc. and Sandoz Inc., produce biopharmaceuticals and
drugs that are similar to those original biopharmaceuticals, respectively.2 The
Court addressed two issues raised by the governing biological patent statute, the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA): (1) what remedy is
available when a biosimilar applicant fails to engage in the disclosure and
negotiation procedures and (2) whether the 180-day notice of commercial
marketing is mandatory under the statute.3
The Supreme Court held that, under the BPCIA provisions outlining the
disclosure and negotiation procedures between biologic and biosimilar
manufacturers, a declaratory-judgment action is the only federal remedy
available for a biosimilar manufacturer’s failure to provide the relevant
information.4 The Supreme Court further held that a biosimilar applicant can
provide notice of commercial marketing before FDA approval.5 For the latter
part of its holding, the Court applied a plain meaning construction to correctly
read the statute as allowing biosimilar applicants to provide premarketing notice
before licensure. This Note will focus primarily on the second prong of the
Supreme Court’s holding. Specifically, this Note will explore the factual and
statutory background preceding Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. to both explain the
two prongs of the Supreme Court’s decision and then argue that the second half
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 J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank my family
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1. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017).
2. H. Mellstedt et. al., The challenge of biosimilars, 19 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 411 (2008).
3. Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1669.
4. See infra notes 113–119 and accompanying text.
5. Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. 1664.
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of the Court’s holding facilitates the goal of the BPCIA of providing an efficient
pathway to promote drug innovation accessibility of biosimilars to patients.
I. THE CASE
Amgen, Inc. and Amgen Manufacturing, Ltd., collectively referred to as the
plaintiffs “Amgen” in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., began marketing the biosimilar
Filgrastim, a drug used by chemotherapy patients to stimulate blood cell
production,6 under the brand name Neupogen in 1991.7 In July 2014, the
defendants Sandoz, Inc., Sandoz International GMBH, and Sandoz GMBH,
collectively named “Sandoz,” applied to the Food & Drug Administration (FDA)
for approval of a biosimilar product based on Amgen’s Neupogen.8 Afterwards,
Amgen filed suit against the defendants, in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California based on two grounds.9 Amgen alleged first
that Sandoz failed to follow the disclosure and negotiation procedures of the
BPCIA10 and second, that Sandoz acted unlawfully by planning to market its
biosimilar immediately upon FDA approval of its biosimilar instead of waiting
180 days after approval.11 Ultimately, Amgen argued that it was entitled to
injunctive relief under California’s unfair competition law.12
The district court was tasked with deciding whether Sandoz violated the
BPCIA when it failed to follow the negotiation and disclosure procedures.13 To
resolve this issue, the court compared the statutory interpretation of the BPCIA
by both Amgen and Sandoz.14 Amgen argued that Sandoz violated the BPCIA
when the company first, failed to provide Amgen with a copy of its Biologic
License Application (BLA) within twenty days after the FDA received the
application for review and, second, by choosing not to participate in a disclosure
and negotiation process.15 Amgen asserted that the BPCIA requires BLA

6. Filgrastim, Filgrastim-sndz, Tbo-filgrastim Injection, MEDLINEPLUS (Nov. 15, 2017)
https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a692033.html.
7. See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Amgen I), No. 14-cv-04741-RS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34537,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015).
8. Id. at *3.
9. Id. at *10–11.
10. Id. at *14.
11. Id. Based on these alleged violations, Amgen stated that it could assert conversion and patent
infringement claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). In response, Sandoz filed
counterclaims, contesting the UCL and conversion claims by stating that its conduct of not participating
in disclosure and negotiation procedures was permissible and not constituting patent infringement. Id. at
*3–4.
12. Amgen I, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34537, at *1.
13. Id. at *16.
14. Id. at *16–21.
15. Id. at *14.
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applicants to comply with the prescribed disclosure and negotiation procedures.16
The district court agreed with Amgen that the repeated use of the word “shall”
in these subsections of the BPCIA supported its argument.17 However, the court
also determined that “shall” in this context does not imply that an action is
mandatory in every context.18 In this case, it would be permissible to interpret
the BPCIA to mean that the disclosure and negotiation steps are required only
when both parties elect to participate in the procedures.19
The district court further determined that the disclosure and negotiation
procedures at issue were optional because of subsections § 262(l)(9)(B) and (C)
created by the BPCIA, which outline another available mechanism when the
biosimilar applicant fails to participate in the disclosure and negotiation
process.20 In such instances, the manufacturer of the original biologic product,
also known as the reference product sponsor, is allowed to begin patent litigation
immediately.21 The court found this statutory option for reference product
sponsors to be consistent with the congressional intent of the BPCIA, which is
to expedite patent litigation.22 Specifically, if the procedures are optional, the
biosimilar applicant would be justified in bypassing potentially lengthy
disclosure and negotiation procedures in favor of immediate resolution through
litigation.23 Based on this interpretation, the court held that it was not only
permissible for Sandoz to avoid the disclosure and negotiation procedures, but
also a more accurate interpretation of the statute.24
The second issue the district court examined was whether Sandoz acted
unlawfully by informing Amgen of its plans to commercially market its
biosimilar product before receiving FDA approval.25 The court again concluded
that Amgen’s statutory interpretation of the negotiation and disclosure provisions
of the BPCIA was not persuasive.26 The quoted language from the statute is that
the applicant “shall provide notice to the reference product sponsor not later than
180 days before the date of the first commercial marketing of the biological
product licensed under subsection (k).”27 According to the court, Amgen
determined that “FDA approval must be a condition precedent to valid notice”

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at *16.
Id.
Id. at *17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A) (2018).
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because of the choice to use “licensed” in the past tense.28 Amgen construed this
wording to mean that the applicant can only give the required 180-day notice
after the FDA approves the BLA.29 The court disagreed with Amgen and
concluded that the focus of the statute is to ensure that the applicant provide
notice before “first commercial marketing” because FDA approval is required
before entrance into the market.30 The court found that the word “before” in the
context of the statute did not refer to the timeline of licensure, but to commercial
marketing; therefore Sandoz did not act unlawfully by providing notice before
FDA approval.31 Amgen filed a timely appeal on the final judgment.32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also examined
Amgen’s statutory interpretation. This court affirmed the district court’s ruling
on the disclosure and negotiation issue based on the fact that 42 U.S.C. §
262(l)(9)(C) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) collectively provide an option for the
reference product sponsor when the applicant fails to disclose.33 The court found
that Sandoz initiated this pathway by not participating in the disclosure and
negotiation procedures.34 Therefore, Amgen was not entitled to an injunction
based on California law, which states that where the underlying statute expressly
provides a remedy, any other remedy is not available.35
However, the court of appeals found Amgen’s interpretation of the
contested disclosure and negotiation provisions created by the BPCIA persuasive
and ultimately held that these sections require a biosimilar product to be licensed
prior to notice of commercial marketing.36 The court reasoned that Congress
intended for the FDA to approve the product before the biosimilar applicant can
give notice of commercial marketing to the reference product sponsor.37
Specifically, the court stated that if Congress meant to allow notice before
licensure, the statute would have referred to “‘the biological product that is the
subject of’ the application” instead of “the biological product licensed” as the
statute describes.38 The court interpreted the notice provision of the BPCIA, §
262(l)(8)(A), as mandatory under all circumstances, unlike other provisions that
are triggered by an applicant’s opting into the negotiation and disclosure

28. Amgen I, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34537, at *22.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *24–25.
32. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Amgen II) 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Amgen also filed an appeal
based on the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. Id.
33. Id. at 1357.
34. Id. at 1357.
35. Id. at 1356, 1360.
36. Id. at 1358.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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procedures.39 Thus, the court ruled that Sandoz was prohibited from marketing
its biosimilar until the 180-day timeframe following FDA approval of the
product had lapsed.40
In summation, the court of appeals decided the case in favor of Sandoz on
whether the procedures were mandatory and in Amgen’s favor on whether it was
unlawful for a biosimilar applicant to give notice of first commercial marketing
before FDA approval. As a result, both Amgen and Sandoz appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in a consolidated case.41
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The statutory background surrounding Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. can be
confusing so it is necessary to explore the legislative background of the BPCIA
to provide context for the provisions at issue in the litigation. Section II.A
examines the development and purpose of the BPCIA. Section II.B focuses on
the regulatory procedures governing the patent relationship between biologic and
biosimilar manufacturers as outlined in the BPCIA as well as the relevant
provisions contributing to the tension between Sandoz and Amgen. Finally,
Section II.C. focuses on the two issues Amgen raised in the original litigation
that were subsequently presented to the Supreme Court.
A. The BPCIA: A Legislative Overview
The pharmaceutical industry is very lucrative in the United States.
Contributing to this are the high prices of drugs known as biologics, which are
drug products derived from living organisms.42 The Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2010 was included in President Obama’s
comprehensive Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.43 The two primary
goals of the BPCIA are: (1) promoting the innovation of biologic therapies by
providing incentives and (2) promoting the accessibility of biologic therapies by
keeping prices affordable.44 The legislation was drafted as an amendment to the

39. Id. at 1360.
40. Id. Sandoz’s biosimilar Zarxio was approved by the FDA on March 6, 2015, meaning that in
order to comply with the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the company could not
place its drug on the market until September 2, 2015. Id.
41. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017).
42. Geoffrey M Levit, The Drugs/Biologics Approval Process, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW REGULATION 125, 167 (Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 6th ed.
2017).
43. Implementation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/ucm215089.htm (last updated
Feb. 12, 2016); see also supra note 27, at 168.
44. Ude Lu, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Striking a Delicate Balance Between
Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 613 (2014).
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Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to create an expedited approval pathway for
biosimilar products, also sometimes referred to as “follow-on biologics (FOBs)”,
which are characterized as “highly similar” to biological product that is FDA
approved.45 Specifically, the BPCIA amended § 351 of the PHSA by adding
subsections (k)46 and (l).47
The new § 351(k) of the PHSA describes the process of licensing a
biosimilar product.48 Four years after a biologic reference product is licensed,
anyone can submit a biosimilar application for approval based on the licensed
biologic product. This application must include information in five categories,
the first of which, in relevant part, requires demonstrating that “the biological
product that is the subject of the application is ‘biosimilar’ to a reference
product.”49 The FDA is required to license a biosimilar if the information in the
application is “sufficient to show that the biological product is biosimilar to the
reference product.”50
Additionally, § 351(k) explains the exclusivity periods that exist for both
the biosimilar drug and the reference product.51 The first drug that is classified
by the FDA as a biosimilar of the reference product earns two types of
exclusivity. First, the biosimilar is the only product that can be classified as
interchangeable with the reference product, and second, that biosimilar is granted
at least one year of market exclusivity after the biosimilar first commercially
markets its product.52 The reference product sponsor, on the other hand, enjoys
a long period of market exclusivity that lasts for twelve years from the date it
was first licensed by the FDA regardless of whether or not its original patent has
expired.53
The long patent life for biologic products spurred the need for legislation
like the BPCIA, particularly during the early 2000s when biologics began to
45. Lu, supra note 44, at 613–14.
46. Id.
47. See infra notes 64–73 and accompanying text.
48. Levit, supra note 42, at 168.
49. Levit, supra note 42, at 169. The remaining requirements for the information to be provided in a
subsection (k) application are: “2) the biosimilar product and reference product use the same mechanism(s)
of action for the condition(s) of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling, to
the extent the mechanism(s) of action are known for the reference product; 3) the condition(s) of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling proposed for the biosimilar product have been
previously approved for the reference product; 4) the biosimilar product has the same out of
administration, dosage form, and strength as the reference product; and 5) the facility in which the
biosimilar product is manufactured, processed, packed, or held meets standards designed to assure that the
product continues to be safe, pure, and potent.” Id.
50. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C.§ 262(k)(7)(B) (2018).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6). Under this provision, other periods of the patent activity, including the
litigation, can determine when a biosimilar’s period of market exclusivity begins. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7).
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comprise to a significant portion of the pharmaceutical industry.54 As a result,
the industry recognized that the development of an abbreviated pathway for the
approval of biosimilars would result in high savings,55 similar to what the HatchWaxman bill accomplished for small molecule drugs.56 The fact that big
pharmaceutical companies faced little to no market competition as their biologics
patents began to expire revealed the need for an abbreviated biosimilar approval
pathway.57
In response, the BPCIA created the Abbreviated Biologic License
Application (aBLA) pathway for biosimilar drugs.58 The aBLA pathway
increases the accessibility of biologic therapies, which are typically expensive,
by encouraging market competition as a means of developing cheaper drug
therapies for consumers.59 Once the FDA licenses the biosimilar, the product can
begin competing with the reference product.60 The BPCIA simultaneously
encourages innovation by biologics companies by offering the incentive of a
twelve-year period of market exclusivity for those biologics.61 This is a win for
biologics companies because the market exclusivity period can potentially last
longer than that of an active patent.62
Although the BPCIA has resulted in positive outcomes for pharmaceutical
companies, there is still tension between biologics and biosimilar manufacturers
that fundamentally stems from market control. The two statutory provisions of
the BPCIA that are responsible for the most litigation are: (1) the necessity of the
information exchange procedure known as the “patent dance” and (2) the

54. Lu, supra note 44, at 618.
55. Biogenerics: Not Yet a Reality in the U.S., TRADER THOUGHTS 1 (Dec. 24, 2011),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/58230-biogenerics-not-yet-a-reality-in-the-u-s.
56. Similar to the BPCIA, the Hatch-Waxman Act focuses on promoting innovation and accessibility
by providing a patent term extension (PTE) incentive for innovators and establishing the abbreviated new
drug application (ANDA) to help generic drugs enter the market. Lu, supra note 44, at 615.
57. Id. at 619–20.
58. Id. at 614.
59. Id. 633–34.
60. Gregory S. Asciolla & Matthew J. Perez, “Shall We Dance?” – Biologic-Biosimilar Competition
Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1, 2 (2015).
61. Lu, supra note 44, at 623–24 (describing this exclusivity period as one of the major tools outlined
in the BPCIA to encourage innovation). See also 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018).
62. Lu, supra note 44, at 623–24. Other benefits to this exclusivity period: it covers more than one
patent because FDA approval on each biological entity coverage on average 2.7 patents; FDA exclusivity
is independent from patent exclusivity even if the patent for a biologic expires, the FDA exclusivity is still
applicable; FDA exclusivity eliminates design around issues because it applies to the final product so a
generic company can’t get FDA approval on that basis that it manufactured the final product differently.
Id. at 623–24. See also Felix Shin, Leaping from the Patent Cliff into the Global Drug Gap: Overcoming
Exclusivity to Provide Affordable Biosimilars, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 429 (2016)
(stating that the 12 year exclusivity period runs parallel to any patents already held by the reference
product sponsor which offers greater security for the reference product sponsor in the drug market).
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necessity of getting FDA approval prior to issuing the 180-notice of commercial
marketing.63
B. The New § 262(l) and The “Patent Dance”
The BPCIA created a series of private information exchanges between the
biosimilar applicant and the reference product sponsor known as the “patent
dance” in an effort to try and avoid patent litigation.64 This information exchange
is divided into five steps called the “patent dance” which are further split into
two stages of litigation. 65 The first stage of litigation begins after the FDA
informs a biosimilar applicant that its subsection (k) application has been
accepted for review.66 Within twenty days of that notice, the biosimilar applicant
must submit to the reference product sponsor a copy of its application and any
information concerning the processes used to manufacture the biosimilar.67 The
next step requires the reference product sponsor to provide a list of patents that
cover the biologic product to the subsection (k) applicant within sixty days of the
application being submitted.68 This list also includes “patents that the reference
product sponsor would be prepared to license to the applicant.”69 These steps
outlined in the statute also suggests that the subsection (k) applicant can within
sixty days provide a list of patents to which the applicant reasonably believes the
reference product sponsor could assert a claim of patent infringement.70
Next, the applicant and the reference product sponsor participate in “good
faith negotiations” to determine which of the patents listed by the applicant from
the preceding step “shall be the subject of an action for patent infringement.”71
If the parties agree on which patents may be subject to patent infringement
actions, the reference product sponsor must bring the infringement action within
30 days.72 A biosimilar applicant’s failure to adhere to these procedures entitles
the reference product sponsor to a declaratory patent infringement action.73 This
marks the end of the fist phase of the litigation process.
During the second phase of litigation, the biosimilar applicant needs to
provide notice to the reference product sponsor at least 180 days before it begins
63. Gregory S. Asciolla & Matthew J. Perez, “Shall We Dance?” – Biologic-Biosimilar Competition
Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 3 (2015).
64. Levit, supra note 42, at 171.
65. 42 U.S.C § 262(l)(2)–(6) (2018).
66. Levit, supra note 42, at 171.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(B)(i).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(6).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(B).
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commercially marketing its biosimilar product.74 Once the reference product
sponsor receives notice, they can move for a preliminary injunction on any
patents previously identified in the lists of patents held by the reference product
sponsor that did not move past the first stage of the patent litigation.75
It can be challenging to keep track of the different patent negotiation and
litigation steps and one question the “patent dance” raises is whether or not the
information exchange between the applicant and reference product sponsor is
mandatory or optional.76 Proponents of a mandatory patent dance argue that the
framework provides certainty and protection for both the reference product
sponsor and the biosimilar applicant because each party can concurrently prepare
for litigation under an establishing process following the approval of a biosimilar
application.77 On the other hand, if the “patent dance” is optional, biosimilar
applicants gain the advantage of being in a position to dictate the nature of its
interaction with the reference product sponsor from the point of biosimilar
application approval.78
C. Two Issues on Point: Identifying The Appropriate Federal Remedy and The
Notice of Commercial Marketing timing Requirement
As the Supreme Court recognized, the patent scheme responsible for the
litigation between Sandoz and Amgen is a complicated one. First, this section
will examine the congressional intent behind supplying a federal remedy for a §
262(l)(2)(A) violation and, second, this section will highlight the treatment of the
notice requirement under § 262(l)(2)(A).
1. What is the federal remedy?
The BPCIA created § 262(l)(2)(A), which states that a subsection (k)79
applicant “shall provide to the reference product sponsor a copy of the
application” and “such other information that describes the process or processes
used to manufacture the biological product that is the subject of such
application.”80 This language suggests that a biosimilar applicant must provide
74. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(B).
76. Dov Hirsch, The Riddle of the Mysterious Patent Dance Wrapped in an Enigma: Is the Patent
Dance of the BPCIA Optional or Mandatory, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 645, iv
(2017) (describing that whether the “patent dance” is mandatory or optional has implications for the
pharmaceutical industry, specifically because a designation of mandatory or optional changes which party,
the biologic manufacturer or the biosimilar applicant, has a greater advantage and bargaining position
during the stages of negotiation outlined in the BPCIA).
77. Hirsch, supra note 76, at 670.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
80. 42 U.S.C.§ 262(l)(2)(A).
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the aforementioned information and it follows that there is a remedy available
when the biosimilar applicant fails to do so. The BPCIA acknowledges this by
stating that when a subsection (k) applicant does not provide the information
listed in § 262(l)(2)(A), the reference product sponsor can bring an action for “a
declaration of infringement, validity, or enforceability of any patent that claims
the biological product or a use of the biological product.”81
Understanding how the BPCIA works to identify violations, like a failure
to disclose, and the associated remedies, requires careful statutory interpretation.
One principle of statutory construction is that where a statute identifies a certain
remedy, courts should uphold enforcement of that remedy and avoid reading
more remedies under the statute.82 This means that the strongest evidence for the
remedy Congress intended to provide is within the language of the statute,83 in
this case, the BPCIA. Another pillar of statutory construction helpful in
understanding the BPCIA is relying on the legislative history of the
congressional measure to infer intent.84 In 2007 the U.S. Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor & Pensions engaged in discussions to make
amendments to the PHSA.85 The committee drafted the S.1695 bill to include
provisions for both patent litigation and remedies “available to the innovator
upon a finding that the patent was valid and infringed.”86
The proposed amendments also included declaratory judgment provisions
to § 351(l) of the PHSA. One amended provision indicates that where a
biosimilar applicant has failed to provide its application and manufacturing
information, the reference product sponsor could bring a declaratory judgment
in reference to the “patent that claimed the biological product or a use of the
biological product.”87 This language survived for the next three years and

81. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C).
82. Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (acknowledging that whether or
not a statute “creates a cause of action either expressly or by implication, [it] is basically a matter of
statutory construction.”).
83. For a discussion on the weight of evidence the statute provides in revealing congressional intent,
see Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981), stating that “[i]n the
absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress
provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.”
84. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13.
85. Krista Hessler Carver, et. al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 671, 755 (2010). It is important to note that the PHSA
is an important legislative ancestor of the BPCIA because the Biologics Act of 1902 was incorporated as
§ 351 of the PHSA, which subsequently became the provision amended by the BPCIA. Id. For a recent
discussion on the legislative history leading up to the enactment of both the Biologics Act and the PHSA,
see Terry S. Coleman, Early Developments in the Regulation of Biologics, 71 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 544
(2016).
86. Hessler, supra note 85, at 755.
87. Id. (citing S. 1695 2(a)(2), proposed PHSA § 351(l)(9)(C)).
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through the BPCIA was incorporated as § 262(l)(9)(C).88 Therefore, both the
language of this provision and its legislative history suggest that Congress
intended to provide a declaratory judgment action as the remedy for the reference
product sponsor when the applicant fails to disclose as outlined under §
262(l)(2)(A).
2.. The Requirement of Notice of First Commercial Marketing
The BPCIA established a notice requirement under § 262(l)(8)(A), which
had the unfortunate effect of fostering tension between biologics and biosimilar
manufacturers. This subsection of the statute states that the biosimilar applicant
needs to provide notice to the reference product sponsor of its plans to market a
biosimilar product “not later than 180 days before the date of first commercial
marketing.”89 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. presented the question of whether a
biosimilar applicant can only provide premarketing notice after the FDA
approves its biosimilar product.90 Treatment of § 262(l)(8)(A) indicates that the
consensus among lower courts is to interpret the provision as requiring FDA
approval of a biosimilar before the applicant can give notice to the reference
product sponsor. For example, in Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,91 the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit embraced this consensus by holding that the
subsection (k) applicant must wait for FDA approval before it can give notice of
commercial marketing.92
The following year in Janssen Biotech v. Celltrion Healthcare,93 the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts relied on the holding in
Amgen, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. to interpret that the negotiation and disclosure section
of the BPCIA to mean that biosimilar applicants could only give post-approval
notice of first commercial marketing.94 In its complaint, plaintiff Janssen argued
that because the defendants (Celltrion and Hospira) provided notice before FDA
approval of their biosimilar version of Jannsen’s Remicade, the defendants acted
in contrast to the purpose of the BPCIA’s statutory timeline.95 According to
Janssen, requiring the applicant to wait for FDA approval allows the parties to
adjudicate patent disputes and affords the biologics innovator time to seek a
preliminary injunction to prevent the biosimilar from entering the market.96 The
88. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(C) (2018).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (l)(8)(A).
90. See supra Part II.
91. Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc. (Amgen III), 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
92. Amgen III, 827 F.3d at 1054.
93. Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Celltrion Healthcare Co., 210 F. Supp. 3d 244 (D. Mass. 2016).
94. Janssen, 210 F. Supp. at 246–47.
95. Complaint of Petitioner at 3, No. 1:15-v-10698-MLW, Janssen Biotech Inc. v. Celltrion
Healthcare Co., 210 F. Supp. 3d 244 (D. Mass. 2016).
96. Id.
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district court found these arguments persuasive and the opinion further implied
that FDA licensure was a prerequisite to premarketing notice.97
Janssen’s arguments acknowledge the policy concerns surrounding the
BPCIA’s commercial marketing provision. Innovators of biologics, like Janssen,
prefer to support a requirement for licensure prior to notice because it allows
them fully exercise their power in the patent litigation and resolution process as
outlined in the BPCIA. On the other hand, biosimilar applicants prefer a flexible
interpretation that allows notice prior to licensure. This is because as a strategic
move, an applicant who gives notice before FDA approval could attempt to
bypass the second phase of patent litigation by informing the reference product
sponsor that their product is ready for market.98
Primarily, the BPCIA provides the framework for reference product
sponsors like Amgen and biosimilar manufacturers like Sandoz to interact with
one another. Within this framework, the patent dance and notice of first
commercial marketing by the biosimilar applicant are just two such interactions
that can result in litigation between pharmaceutical companies. It then becomes
the role of a court to determine what remedy, if any, is available, and whether
certain provisions of the BPCIA, such as the disclosure and notice of commercial
marketing provisions, are optional or mandatory for the parties in the suit.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the United States Supreme Court’s decision
included two holdings. The Court examined the BPCIA and held first that
injunctive relief was unavailable as a federal remedy under § 262(l)(2)(A).99
Second, the Court held that a biosimilar applicant is allowed to give notice of
first commercial marketing prior to FDA approval under § 262(l)(8)(A) of the
statute.100 This section will explore how the Supreme Court came to both
conclusions by (1) examining the Court’s interpretation of the relevant statutory
provisions and (2) identifying how the Court differentiated from the analysis of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

97. Janssen, 210 F. Supp. at 246. The district judge opined that although the FDA approved defendant
Cellitron’s biosimilar product in April 2016, the company could not begin selling its product until October
2016. Id.
98. John L Marquardt & Stephen R Auten, Strategic Considerations under the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act, 23 EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATS. 915, 918 (2013),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1517/13543776.2013.813935.
99. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1674 (2017).
100. Id. at 1677.
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A.. Identifying the Appropriate Remedy for Negotiation and Disclosure
Violations
The Supreme Court began its analysis by combing through the relevant
statutory provisions to determine whether the information exchange between the
applicant and reference product sponsor described by the BPCIA is enforceable
by injunction.101 The Court identified 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) and 35 U.S.C. §
271(e), the statutory scheme for patent infringement, as outlining what remedies
are available when an applicant does not comply with the disclosure
requirements.102
The Court focused closely on two clauses within 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C).
Clauses (i) and (ii) recognize that an act of artificial infringement can result in
either of two pathways after the applicant receives notice from the FDA that its
application is under review.103 Clause (i) states that artificial infringement occurs
when the biosimilar applicant submits an application regarding the patents
potentially subject to suit, which were identified by each party in the § 262(l)(3)
lists created previously.104 In the alternative, clause (ii) states that artificial
infringement occurs when the applicant submits an application without first
sharing the application and manufacturing information with the reference
product sponsor so the parties never reach the stage of assembling § 262(l)(3)
lists to identify what patents might be subject to suit.105 Therefore, under this
section, submission of the application represents an act of artificial infringement
“with respect to any patent that could have been included on the lists.”106
Based on this, the Court determined that the two provisions of §
271(e)(2)(C) worked together to identify that the act of infringement for which a
remedy is available under § 271(e) is the act of submitting the biosimilar
application.107 The Supreme Court then reasoned that Sandoz’s failure to provide
its application or manufacturing information is not the sort of action identified as
an act of artificial infringement within the statute.108 The Court stressed this point
in an attempt to clarify why the lower court’s reasoning, despite reaching the
correct conclusion on this issue, was flawed. According to the Supreme Court,
the lower court focused on the following language in § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii): “if the
applicant for the application fails to provide the application and information

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1674.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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required under [262(l)(2)(A)]”109 to determine that Sandoz committed artificial
infringement.110 By concluding that Sandoz was guilty of artificial infringement,
the court of appeals concluded that the only remedy available to Amgen was that
prescribed by § 271(e)(4).111 However, the Supreme Court’s focus on the
structure of § 271(e)(2)(C) allowed it to conclude that neither clause describes
an “applicant’s failure to provide its application and manufacturing information
an element of the act of artificial infringement” and furthermore that in neither
clause does “271(e)(4) provide a remedy for that failure.”112
Next, the Supreme Court moved its discussion to the remedy available
when an applicant fails to provide its application and manufacturing
information.113 As enacted by the BPCIA, § 262(l)(9)(C) a sponsor is authorized
to immediately file an action for a declaratory judgment based on an act of
artificial infringement as defined by § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii).114 In this case, Sandoz’s
submission of its application to the FDA without first providing the application
and manufacturing information to Amgen constituted an act of artificial
infringement,115 entitling Amgen to a remedy under § 262(l)(9)(C).116 The Court
determined that § 262(l)(9)(C) was meant to provide the only federal remedy for
an applicant’s failure to comply with the disclosure requirements under §
262(l)(2)(A).117 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas, relying on Great-West
Life & Annuity v. Ins. Co. v. Knudson, argued that the best evidence of what
remedy Congress intended to provide for such a failure was the language and
structure of the BPCIA itself.118 Based on the language of this provision, it was
clear to the Court that “Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that
it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.”119
The Supreme Court relied on additional text within the BPCIA to support
the position that Congress intended to make available to a reference product

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1675.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Neither party was in dispute that Sandoz failed to comply with the disclosure procedures outlined
in § 262(l)(2)(A). Id. at 1676.
116. Id. at 1675.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Great-West Life & Annuity v. Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002)
(demonstrating that where there exists an extensive and comprehensive piece of legislation, in the context
of what equitable remedies are available under Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in
a state action brought to enforce a reimbursement provision by a health plan to recover from a beneficiary
any proceeds paid by a third party, the Supreme Court is reluctant to extend the scope of a statute so as to
infer remedies that are not already outlined in the statute itself)).
119. Id. at 1675 (quoting Great-West Life & Annuity v. Ins. Co. v. Knudson 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002)).
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sponsor only a declarative judgment action only when a biosimilar applicant fails
to disclose its application and manufacturing information. For example, §
262(l)(1)(H) states that a court can consider injunctive relief as an available
remedy for a violation, or threatened violation, of the rules of confidentiality as
they relate to any information disclosed under § 262(l).120 According to the
Court, because Congress explicitly attached injunctive relief as a remedy for a
confidentiality violation, an applicant’s failure to disclose is not a violation that
Congress intended to attach injunctive relief as the remedy.121 Therefore, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that enforcing compliance
with § 262(l)(2)(A) via an injunction was not the appropriate remedy for Amgen
under federal law.122
B. Identifying the Timeline for Notice of First Commercial Marketing Under
the BPCIA
The second prong of the Supreme Court’s holding addressed whether or
not, the BPCIA allows a biosimilar applicant to provide notice of first
commercial marketing to the reference product sponsor only after FDA
approval.123 Specifically, the Court examined whether Sandoz complied with the
law when it informed Amgen of plans to start marketing its biosimilar
immediately after receiving FDA approval of its drug.124
The BPCIA adopted § 262(l)(8)(A) as the statutory text that refers to the
timeline concerning when a biosimilar applicant is to provide notice of first
commercial marketing. The Court again focused on the structure of the provision
itself to interpret its meaning125 The Supreme Court concentrated on the exact
language of the statute, which states that the applicant “shall provide notice to
the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of first
commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection
(k).”126 The Court interpreted this as requiring the applicant to provide notice at
least 180 days before the date of first commercial marketing.127

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Court declined to review the Federal Circuit’s holding that Sandoz’s failure to disclose
its application and manufacturing information was not “‘unlawful under California’s unfair competition
law’” both because this did not present a question of federal law and whether the BPCIA’s negotiation
and disclosure procedures are relevant matters only insofar as to determine whether there was unlawful
conduct under the state law. Id.
123. Id. at 1677.
124. Id. at 1672.
125. Id. at 1677.
126. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A) (2018)).
127. Id.
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Next, the Court evaluated the strength of Amgen’s main argument that the
statute requires a biosimilar product to be approved by the FDA before the
applicant can inform the reference product sponsor of first commercial
marketing.128 Amgen argued that because § 262(l)(8)(A) referred to “the
biological product licensed” instead of just “‘the biological product that is the
subject of’ the application” like in other BPCIA provisions, that meant that notice
of first commercial marketing can only come after FDA approval129 The
Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument because the provision that
Amgen relied on, § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I),130 inherently needs to reference the
biological product that the subsection (k) application is based on, otherwise
referring to a licensed product in this provision would not have made sense.131
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that an applicant could provide notice
of commercial marketing prior to FDA licensure and thus Sandoz was in full
compliance with § 262(l)(8)(A).132 Ultimately, the Court felt that the lower
appellate court erred in granting an injunction to prevent Sandoz from marketing
its filgrastim product until 180 days after licensure.133 The two courts differed on
this issue because each relied on different interpretations for the number of
timing requirements for notice of commercial marketing imposed by the BPCIA.
The Supreme Court interpreted § 262(l)(8)(A) as imposing only the requirement
that the applicant needed to provide notice at least 180 days prior to marketing,
but not necessarily prior to licensure.134 The federal circuit, however, interpreted
this same provision as imposing two timing requirements such that the biosimilar
applicant would be providing notice of commercial marketing both after the FDA
approves the product and at least 180 days before the applicant begins marketing
its biosimilar.135 The Supreme Court reasoned that the lower court incorrectly
interpreted the statute, and supported its argument with the fact that the adjacent
provision, § 262(l)(8)(B), expressly outlined two timing requirements.136

128. Id.
129. Id. (referencing Brief for Amgen Inc. et al.).
130. This section “requires the applicant to explain why the sponsor’s patents are ‘invalid,
unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the commercial marketing of the biological product that is the
subject of the subsection (k) application.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (2018)).
131. Id. Section 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I) references the product that is the subject of the (k) application
because the applicant would be unable to make the evaluation identified in the section after licensure
“because the biosimilar’s specifications may change during the application process.” The Supreme Court
also found Amgen’s policy arguments unpersuasive. Id.
132. Id. at 1678.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1677.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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The Supreme Court relied on Russello v. United States137 to strengthen its
assertion that if Congress meant to impose two timing requirements in §
262(l)(8)(A), “it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the
immediately following subparagraph.”138 For these reasons, the Supreme Court
reversed the federal circuit’s holding that a biosimilar applicant can only provide
notice to the reference product sponsor of commercial marketing following FDA
approval. Instead, the Supreme Court held that a biosimilar applicant is permitted
to provide notice of first commercial marketing before FDA approval of the
biosimilar drug product.139
IV. ANALYSIS
In Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the Supreme Court’s holding is two-fold. This
Analysis focuses on the second part of the Court’s opinion, which articulated the
correct holding that a biosimilar applicant could provide premarketing notice
prior to FDA licensure.140 The holding is significant for the following reasons:
(1) it is consistent with the innovation and drug accessibility goals of the BPCIA;
and (2) it both creates a new incentive for biosimilar manufacturers and acts as a
mechanism that ensures the exclusivity period for the original biologic product
of the reference sponsor is limited to exactly twelve years.
A. Permitting Pre-approval Notice of Commercial Marketing is Consistent
With the Goals of the BPCIA
At its basic level, the BPCIA provides an accelerated approval pathway for
biosimilars, which incentivizes competition between biologics manufacturers
and biosimilar manufacturers while reducing overall costs to patients.141 The
Supreme Court’s unanimous 9–0 decision in Sandoz of allowing biosimilar
applicants to provide premarketing notice before FDA approval is consistent
with these goals.
Additionally, the BPCIA provides a solution to the unique challenge
biosimilar manufacturers experience when entering the drug market.142 This
challenge is due in part to the manufacturing process associated with creating

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 1, 16 (1983).
Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1677 (2017) (quoting Russello, 464 U.S. at 23).
Id.
Id. at 1678.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Erwin A. Blackstone and Joseph P. Fuhr, The Economics of Biosimilars, 6 AM. HEALTH & DRUG
BENEFITS 469, 471 (2013) (describing that biosimilar market entry is first delayed by the barriers imposed
in needing to overcome the unique hurdles “associated with manufacturing, marketing, storage (cold) and
other distribution issues, delivery devices, immunogenicity (i.e., patient adverse reactions because of live
organisms), and special requirements for pharmacovigilance (ie, postsale monitoring)).
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biologic drugs, which are known for their structural complexity.143 Biologics are
developed from living cells144 and because individual cells are often not perfect
copies of each other, this leads to slight variations in the development of the
biosimilars based on those biologic products.145 This prevents biosimilars from
being marketed as perfect or identical substitutes for biologic products, thereby
requiring creative marketing strategies that demonstrate why biosimilars are still
beneficial to patients in order to assuage any skepticism from stakeholders.146
The challenge of creating biosimilars results in fewer biosimilar entrants to
the drug market,147 making it difficult to boost innovation among biosimilar
manufacturers. Thus, biologics manufacturers are in a position to significantly
monopolize the drug market by requiring biosimilar applicants to wait 180 days
after FDA approval to provide commercial marketing notice.148 For example,
Amgen produces a substantial fraction of the biologic products for common
medical conditions and in 2016, benefitted from about $16.7 billion in U.S.
sales.149 Therefore, it does little to foster innovation when the same companies
like Amgen, Hoffman-la Roche,150and Johnson & Johnson151 produce a bulk of
biologic pharmaceuticals for common medical conditions.152

143. Bhupinder Singh Sekhon & Vikrant Saluja, Biosimilars: An Overview, DOVE PRESS J.:
BIOSIMILARS 1, 2–3 (2011) (describing that some of the difficulty associated with manufacturing biologic
products is that they are much bigger molecules than small molecule drugs, adding considerably to the
molecular weight of biologic products).
144. Bruno Calo Fernandez & Juan Leonardo Martinez-Hurtado, Biosimilars: Company Strategies to
Capture Value from the Biologics Market, 5 PHARMACEUTICALS 1393, 1397 (2012).
145. Id.
146. John Carlsen, MHA & Kristi Skorija, Biosimilars: The Commercial Challenge, COVANCE BLOG
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://blog.covance.com/2014/09/biosimilars-commercial-challenge/.
147. Henry Grabowski et al, Biosimilar Pathway, 41 SETON L. REV., 511, 538 (2011).
148. One way that exclusivity periods for biologics manufacturers exists is in the way that these
companies are able to sell their products at “monopoly rates,” meaning that biologics innovators become
more incentivized to maintain these monopolies as long as possible, to the detriment of biosimilar
manufacturers. Yaniv Heled, Patents v. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals – Do We
Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOM. TECH. L. REV. 419 (2012).
149. Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets,
HUTCHINS CTR. 1, 4 (2011) (depicting as Table 1: Top 30 biologics by sales, which breaks down the
amount in U.S. dollars of sales in 2016 for pharmaceutical companies producing biologics for particular
medical indications and that Amgen Corporation’s sales in 2016 resulted from products treating
rheumatoid arthritis, cancer, anemia, renal failure, osteoporosis, bone cancer, and HIV/AIDS.).
150. Id. (indicating $14 billion in total sales in 2016 for Hoffmann la-Roche resulting from biologics
targeting cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, macular degeneration, breast cancer, asthma, anemia and renal
failure).
151. Id. (indicating $8.3 billion in total sales in 2016 for Johnson & Johnson resulting from biologics
treating rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn’s disease, psoriasis, and ulcerative colitis).
152. A related problem acknowledged by commentators in the pharmaceutical industry is the overall
decline in the past few years within the Big Pharma sector in research and development productivity,
which at least for brand-name companies resulted in defensive strategies to keep generics from threatening
the market. Ajay Gautam, The Changing Model of Big Pharma: Impacts of Key Trends, 21 DRUG
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Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s holding in Sandoz facilitates
the BPCIA’s goal of innovation because a biosimilar applicant’s product need
not be licensed before the applicant provides notice of commercial marketing,
resulting in quicker drug dissemination once the biosimilar product is
approved.153 This incentivizes biosimilar development because an applicant does
not need to wait until licensure to start developing a successful marketing
strategy and could conceivably plan to enter the market almost immediately
following FDA approval.154 The steady influx of new biosimilars approved by
the FDA will weaken the monopolies held by biologic drug manufacturers,155
which in turn will foster industry competition.
Furthermore, the holding in Sandoz, by encouraging competition between
biologics and biosimilars, does even more to facilitate the second goal of the
BPCIA of promoting accessibility to patients by reducing drug costs.156 A 2009
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report estimated that biosimilar products
would be about ten to thirty percent cheaper than brand-name biologics.157
Although the report argued that the long-term benefits of an abbreviated
biosimilar pathway would not be as immediately apparent as with the generic
drug pathway under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Commission nonetheless
recognized that the ten to thirty percent decrease in price still represented
significant consumer savings.158 A statement from the Congressional Budget
Office in 2010 reiterated this point by suggesting that a biosimilar pathway
would lead to a $7 billion reduction in the federal deficit between 2010 and
2019.159
Unlike their cheaper biosimilar counterparts, most biologics are secured by
patents, which contributes to higher costs for patients who may have few other

DISCOVERY TODAY 379, 380 (Mar. 2016); see also Mannching Sherry Ku, Recent Trends in Specialty
Pharma Business Model, 23 J. FOOD & DRUG ANALYSIS 595, 598 (2015).
153. Aron Fischer, Supreme Court Decides Amgen v. Sandoz: Patent Dance Cannot Be Enforced by
Federal Injunction, Notice of Commercial Marketing Can Be Given at Any Time, BIOLOGICSBLOG (June
14, 2017), https://www.biologicsblog.com/supreme-court-decides-amgen-v-sandoz-patent-dance-cannotbe-enforced-by-federal-injunction-notice-of-commercial-marketing-can-be-given-at-any-time
(emphasizing that the Sandoz’s interpretation of the notice timeline in the BPCIA will allow biosimilar
entry into the drug market sooner).
154. Id.
155. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
156. Christine Blank, Supreme Court Ruling Raises Biosimilars’ Access, MODERNMEDICINE
NETWORK (June 19, 2017), http://www.drugtopics.com/latest/supreme-court-ruling-raises-biosimilarsaccess.
157. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG
COMPETITION 47 (2009) (outlining an analysis of the effects of the creation of an abbreviated pathway for
the development of biosimilars).
158. Id. at v.
159. Grabowski, supra note 147, at 544–545.
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options.160 Against this backdrop, it is crucial to encourage biosimilar
manufacturers to enter these drug markets as soon as the patents for biologics
products expire. As more biosimilars entering the market, competition will
increase among manufacturers of biologics and biosimilars, resulting in lower
prices for consumers because of the desire of pharmaceutical companies to
ensure that their products stay competitive.161 Added biosimilar presence in the
drug market can increase the availability of marketing assessment and
implementation strategies that are primarily used by biologics manufacturers.162
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoz further promotes market
accessibility for biosimilars by creating a mechanism for biosimilar
manufacturers to begin implementing commercial marketing strategies, such as
outreach to doctors and other forms of targeted advertising,163 as soon as the
company obtains FDA approval.164 Faster marketing for biosimilars results in
patients, physicians, and pharmacists, being made aware of the existence of
quality-of-life improving therapies sooner.165 This is significant in light of the
research demonstrating that drug marketing strategies, particularly direct-toconsumer marketing campaigns, result in significant information dissemination
of new products.166 This facilitates having a shorter period between FDA
approval and commercial marketing, which is significant considering the
existing barriers to cheaper drug alternatives, like high copays.167 Consequently,
160. See THE AM. CONSUMER INST. CTR. FOR CITIZEN RESEARCH, LIFE SAVING DRUGS AT LOWER
COSTS,
https://www.theamericanconsumer.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BiosimilarsConsumerGram-Final.pdf (describing that prices per year per patient for certain conditions like blood
diseases, Crohn’s and Hunter’s syndrome can cost $400,000; $50,000; and $375,00 respectively).
161. Id. at 2.
162. Carlsen, supra note 146, at 3.
163. Mary Ebeling, ‘Get with the Program!’: Pharmaceutical marketing, symptom checklists and selfdiagnosis, 73 SOC. SCI. & MED. 825, 826 (2011) (identifying other forms of marketing strategies for
pharmaceuticals, such as targeting other health care professionals, promotional educational events, and
direct-to-consumer advertising).
164. Christine Blank, Supreme Court Ruling Raises Biosimilars’ Access, MODERNMEDICINE
NETWORK (June 19, 2017), http://www.drugtopics.com/latest/supreme-court-ruling-raises-biosimilarsaccess.
165. An analysis of marketing strategies among pharmaceutical companies by McKinsey & Company
suggests that companies can mitigate losses following drug launches by capturing the momentum
associated with early consumer exposure to the product. Hemant Ahlawat, et. al., The Secret of Successful
Drug Launches, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar. 2014) https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticalsand-medical-products/our-insights/the-secret-of-successful-drug-launches.
166. Ebeling, supra note 163, at 826 (citing a 2008 survey conducted to gage direct-to-consumer
advertising in which 91 percent of people who completed the survey indicated that they “had seen or heard
at least one drug advertisement”).
167. HUTCHINS POLICY BRIEF, TEN CHALLENGES IN THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKET – AND TEN
SOLUTIONS 1, 4 (2017). Insurers create these high co-pays to encourage patients to find cheaper
alternatives but, when drug companies engage in the practice of distributing coupons to consumers to
cover high co-pay prices, this has the effect of decreasing the likelihood of patients exploring low-cost
alternatives. Id.
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biosimilar manufacturers can begin benefitting from a lucrative drug market,168
which will contribute to the positive patient outcomes of cheaper prices and
increased accessibility to alternative treatments.
B.. Allowing Pre-Approval Notice of Commercial Marketing Levels the Playing
Field Between Biologic and Biosimilar Manufacturers
The second prong of the holding in Sandoz underscores the leveling of the
playing field between biologics and biosimilars manufacturers in an arena where
the former typically has the upper hand. For example, the steps of the “patent
dance” are advantageous to biologics manufacturers because of the exclusivity
period that follows the licensure for a biologic.169 The BPCIA’s amendments to
subsection (k) of the PHSA create two types of exclusivity for the reference
product sponsor.170 First, an applicant is not allowed to file its aBLA with the
FDA for review until four years after the date that the reference product was first
licensed.171 Second, under § 351(k)(7)(C) of the PHSA, the FDA cannot approve
a biosimilar product sooner than twelve years after licensure of the original
biologic product.172 Thus, the statute creates a security mechanism for biologics
manufacturers by delaying both the applicant’s filing and as well as the
applicant’s hope for approval of its own product for another eight years after
submitting its aBLA.
Biologics manufacturers receive added protection because subsection (k)
requires applicants to wait 180 days after licensure before sending notice of
commercial marketing.173 The twelve-year exclusivity period incentivizes
biologics manufacturers because they stand to benefit from even more market
security than that guaranteed by the patents originally associated with their
products.174 Therefore, strict adherence to a 180-day period before premarketing
notice limits market opportunities for biosimilar manufacturers. Requiring
biosimilar manufacturers to wait another six months to give notice of commercial
marketing extends the exclusivity period to twelve years and six months. Apotex

168. Ester Bloom, Here’s how much the average American spends on health care, CNBC (June 23
2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/23/heres-how-much-the-average-american-spends-onhealth-care.html (citing the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services statistics that show that “‘the
average American spent $9,596 on healthcare’ in 2012, which was ‘up significantly from $7,700 in 2007’”
and that the average spending per person on healthcare is expected to increase to $14,944 in 2023).
169. See infra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
170. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REFERENCE PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY FILED UNDER 351(A) OF
THE PHS ACT 1 (2014).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 62.
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unsuccessfully raised this argument against Amgen in 2015.175 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit interpreted the relevant provision to imply that
FDA approval can occur at the earliest date of twelve years following the
licensure of the reference product.176 Therefore it was not unfair to allow only
post-licensure notice under § 262(l)(8)(A). In its discussion, the court of appeals
expressed that there was nothing preventing the FDA from issuing a license to a
biosimilar product after eleven and a half years with the caveat that it will not be
official until the twelve-year mark.177
However, this argument ignores that a biosimilar applicant with a
provisional license after 11.5 years has to wait another full year from that point
just to give notice to the reference product sponsor about future commercial
marketing. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Amgen Inc.
v. Apotex Inc. appears to minimize this burden to biosimilar manufacturers
simply because they still benefit from eventual FDA approval. The reality is that
a further delay of six months following approval risks imposing a financial
burden on a biosimilar manufacturer who has already spent millions178
developing a product and an effective marketing strategy, only to be required to
wait six another months before it can benefit from its innovation and enter the
market. The Supreme Court’s holding in Sandoz erodes this impediment to
market access by sticking close to the language of § 262(l)(8)(A)179 and
providing only the period of exclusivity proscribed for reference product
sponsors and nothing more. This spells good news for biosimilar applicants, who
now have a way to fight against industry preference of post-licensure notice of
commercial marketing.
Companies, like Amgen, that prefer reading the statute to require applicants
to wait the 180 days insist that period is necessary to give the reference product
sponsor “a period of time to assess and act upon its patent.”180 This argument
loses persuasiveness in light of the premarket litigation scheme already outlined
in the BPCIA, which protects the patent rights of the biologic manufacturer. For
example, under § 262(l)(3)(A) of the BPCIA, the reference product sponsor can
develop a list of patents associated with the reference product and then if the
biosimilar applicant chooses to engage in negotiations, both parties can decide

175. Amgen III, 827 F.3d 1052, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1062.
178. Developing a biosimilar drug costs between $100 and $250 million, making these products more
expensive to manufacture than generic drugs, which typically cost between $1 and $4 million to produce.
Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, The Economics of Biosimilars, 6 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS
469, 471 (2013).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A) (2018).
180. Amgen II, 794 F.3d at 1360.
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which patents will result in litigation.181 If the biosimilar applicant elects not to
participate in these negotiations, the BPCIA makes available preliminary
injunction and declaratory judgment actions to enforce the patents held by the
reference product sponsor. 182 These forms of relief empower the reference
product sponsor to delay the FDA’s approval of a biosimilar, which is a
significant statutory grant of authority.
The effect of the BPCIA in granting biologics manufacturers the ability to
potentially stall biosimilar approval is a powerful deterrent to biosimilar
applicants, especially when compounded with the fact that big biologics
manufacturers have already adopted one strategy of delaying the market entry of
biosimilars. This strategy involves the reference product sponsor giving money,
or other consideration, to the biosimilar applicant in exchange for the applicant
not entering the market immediately.183 These arrangements are known pay-fordelay184 agreements and they ultimately benefit the biologic manufacturer
because a biologic manufacturer that can secure the market delay of a biosimilar
can control higher prices of its product.185 Even the FTC has acknowledged the
inherent danger of these agreements in hindering consumer access to critical and
low-cost generic alternatives.186 As a result, consumers are dramatically limited
in their drug options because the only available products are often biologics,
which are more expensive187 than “traditional drugs of the pharmaceutical
industry.”188
The Supreme Court’s acceptance of the pre-approval notice under §
262(l)(8)(A) of the BPCIA189 limits a biologic manufacturer’s ability to delay a
181. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
183. Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., Biologics and Biosimilars: The Possibility of
Encouraging Innovation and Competition, 11 THE SCITECH L. AM BAR ASS’N 1, 3 (2015).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Others for
Illegally Blocking Lower-Cost Generic Versions of the Branded Drugs Opana ER and Lidoderm (Mar.
31, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-sues-endo-pharmaceuticals-incothers-illegally-blocking-lower (describing the FTC’s most recent 2016 suit in a ten year battle against
drug companies in violation of antitrust laws by using pay-for-delay agreements, which make low-cost
generics less accessible to consumers); see also F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013)
(indicating that in the settlement between the parties, Actavis Inc. agreed not to enter its generic product
into the drug market with until 2015, and this agreement was subsequently followed by the FTC suing the
settling parties on the basis that such agreements were in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
187. See supra note 160.
188. Felix Shin, Leaping from the Patent Cliff into the Global Drug Gap: Overcoming Exclusivity to
Provide Affordable Biosimilars, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 423 (2016) (differentiating
between traditional drugs, which are small molecule drugs typically produced via five to ten chemical
reactions, and biologic products that are typically manufactured using living organisms and may require
between 5,000 and 10,000 chemical reactions).
189. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1678 (2017).
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biosimilar applicant’s market entry. Biologics manufacturers could still try to
enter pay-for-delay agreements, but now that biosimilar applicants can provide
pre-approval notice of commercial marketing without risking a statutory
violation, these arrangements will be less enticing to biosimilar applicants
because they can now market and launch products sooner.190 In fact, the end
result of the Supreme Court’s holding may be in deterring biologics
manufacturers from encouraging pay-for-delay agreements once those
companies realize that biosimilars now have greater incentive to push for earlier
market entry, which is good news for consumers.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s holding is a substantial win for biosimilar
manufacturers because these companies now have an opportunity to challenge
the tight market exclusivity that biologics manufacturers hold.191 Biosimilar
manufacturers now have a more streamlined route to the drug market because
they can provide pre-approval notice of first commercial marketing to reference
product sponsors without violating the BPCIA. The positive effect of this
decision is that it improves access to cost effective therapies so patients no longer
have to rely only on biologic drugs for a wide variety of common medical
conditions.192
V. CONCLUSION
In Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the Supreme Court’s plain language
interpretation and focus on the structure of the BPCIA resulted in the correct
holding that biosimilar applicants can provide the reference product sponsor with
notice of commercial marketing prior to FDA approval. This part of the Court’s
holding reflects the ultimate goals of the BPCIA to promote innovation and drug
accessibility for patients while also recognizing that biosimilar products already
face inherent challenges to gaining market access. Therefore, the BPCIA should
not be interpreted to impose additional barriers to biosimilar manufacturers
whose products act as a cheaper alternative to patients.
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